Reinforcing attitudes in a gatewatching news era: individual-level antecedents to sharing fact-checks on social media by Amazeen, Michelle A. et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
College of Communication BU Open Access Articles
Reinforcing attitudes in a
gatewatching news era:
individual-level antecedents...
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version Accepted manuscript
Citation (published version): Michelle A Amazeen, Chris J Vargo, Toby Hopp. "Reinforcing attitudes
in a gatewatching news era: Individual-level antecedents to sharing





Reinforcing Attitudes in a Gatewatching News Era: 
Individual-level Antecedents to Sharing Fact-checks on Social Media 
 
 
Michelle A. Amazeen*  
Assistant Professor 
Department of Mass Communication, Advertising and Public Relations 
Boston University 
640 Commonwealth Ave. 





Chris J. Vargo 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Advertising, Public Relations, and Media Design 
University of Colorado Boulder 
1511 University Ave. 





Department of Advertising, Public Relations, and Media Design 
University of Colorado Boulder 
1511 University Ave. 
Boulder, CO 80309 
tobias.hopp@colorado.edu  
 




Michelle A. Amazeen (Ph.D., Temple University) is an assistant professor at Boston University. Amazeen’s 
research interests are cross-disciplinary at the intersection of advertising, journalism, and political communication. 
She studies the effects of message features and audience characteristics on persuasion, resistance, and information 
processing.  
 
Chris J. Vargo (Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) is an assistant professor of big data and analytics 
at the University of Colorado Boulder. He specializes in the use of computer science methods to investigate social 
media using theories from the communication and political science disciplines.  
 
Toby Hopp (Ph.D., University of Oregon) is an assistant professor at the University of Colorado Boulder. Hopp’s 
research interests are broadly related to the uses and effects of digital and interactive media, the social and 
motivational factors that underlie uncivil online communication, and organizational transparency.  
2 
Reinforcing Attitudes in a Gatewatching News Era: 
Individual-level Antecedents to Sharing Fact-checks on Social Media 
Amidst fundamental changes to the news industry, relatively little is known about who posts fact-
checks online despite the increasing presence of fact-checking in society. Based upon a content 
analysis of Facebook and Twitter digital trace data and a linked online survey (N = 783), this 
study assesses three sets of individual-level attributes influencing the sharing of fact-checks in 
political conversations on social media: demographics, behaviors, and motivational states. Results 
show that posting fact-checks is linked to age, ideology, and political behaviors. Moreover, an 
individual’s need for orientation (NFO) is an even stronger predictor of sharing a fact-check than 
ideological intensity or relevance, alone, and also influences the type of fact-check format (with 
or without a ratings scale) that is shared. Thus, in an environment increasingly marked by social 
curation rather than only by the producers of news, the motivational state described by NFO has 
important implications beyond just news consumption by also accounting for news sharing, as 
well. Finally, consistent with inoculation theory, participants generally shared fact-checks to 
reinforce their existing attitudes. Consequently, concerns over the effects of fact-checking should 
move beyond a limited-effects approach (e.g., changing attitudes) to also include resisting 
misinformation and reinforcing accurate beliefs.  
 
Keywords: fact-checking; inoculation theory; need for orientation; persuasion; social media 
 
Over the last two decades, journalistic fact-checking has expanded beyond the internal practice 
of identifying and correcting errors prior to publication. The contemporary practice of external or 
political fact-checking entails publicly reporting on the accuracy of a claim or text already 
circulating in the media (Graves & Amazeen, forthcoming). As an effort to combat public 
misinformation, fact-checking has grown tremendously – both in practice and public demand. In 
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the United States (U.S.), fact-checking work by organizations such as FactCheck.org, PolitiFact, 
and Snopes as well as by news outlets like the Associated Press and the Washington Post’s Fact 
Checker became an integral part of the 2016 presidential election (Mantzarlis, 2016b). Moreover, 
fact-checking is viewed favorably and as a necessary responsibility of the news media by four 
out of five registered voters (Barthel & Gottfried, 2016; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015). Against a 
backdrop of dramatically changing news consumption habits (Pearson & Kosicki, 2017), 
scholars are turning their attention to understanding the role of facts in political deliberation. As 
such, this study seeks to explore who shares fact-checks in social media and why.  
Studying who shares fact-checks is important because in the changing media landscape 
where news diffuses via social media, individuals are the new gatekeepers (Bruns, 2011; Pearson 
& Kosicki, 2017; Thorson & Wells, 2015) and, thus, are central to spreading – or stopping – 
misinformation. Political fact-checking has emerged as one remedy to misinformation that 
exemplifies the research and education-based solutions encouraged by scholars (Jackson & 
Jamieson; 2007). Although a growing corpus of scholarship has engaged the effects and 
effectiveness of fact-checking journalism (see Graves & Amazeen, forthcoming; Nieminen & 
Rapeli, 2018), precisely who consumes fact-checks and why is not well understood (Shin & 
Thorson, 2017).  
 Before fact-checks can have any effect, however, they must first be seen and attended to 
by audiences. Serious questions have arisen about the degree to which the former is happening. 
Studies have found that fact-checking has little influence over the agendas of news organizations 
(Vargo, Guo, & Amazeen, 2018) and that people who consume digital misinformation are rarely, 
if ever, also confronted with a corresponding fact-check (Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017). 
Moreover, in a changing media landscape, news consumption in general is constrained less by 
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the gatekeeping theory of journalism – where information is prefiltered by publishers – and 
increasingly by a two-step flow (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) where influential individuals curate 
information for their social networks (Pearson & Kosicki, 2017; Thorson & Wells, 2015). These 
“gatewatchers” curate and provide their own commentary on the news and other information 
provided by official sources before sharing with their followers (Bruns, 2011, p. 117). 
Furthermore, gatewatchers affect perceptions of news and information more than the original 
sources of the news reporting (Media Insight, 2017). Thus, researching who shares fact-checks 
and for what purposes may contribute to our broader understanding of the changing roles of 
individuals in the news diffusion process. 
To be sure, fact-checkers already have a great deal of information about their audiences 
derived from mailing lists, emails they receive, and from daily traffic reports indicating how 
many hits their stories receive. They also know how frequently their stories were mentioned or 
shared on social media sites or linked to by influential news sites. Despite all of this information, 
however, there are blurred boundaries between the multiple audiences that could be responsible 
for these metrics. Not only do lay members of the public consume fact-checks, other journalists 
and media organizations do, too. Thus, the extent to which engagement is distinctly coming from 
politicians, journalists, or lay readers is unclear (Graves, 2016).  
As media effects research becomes increasingly concerned with the diffusion of 
messages, broadly understanding the factors that foster and hinder the sharing of information - 
such as fact-checks - is now just as important as understanding their initial selection or avoidance 
(Cappella, Kim, & Albarracin, 2015). Particularly in today’s complex and user-centered media 
environment, media effects paradigms such as agenda-setting theory — where different 
individuals exhibit similar media agendas — are giving way to effects that are contingent upon 
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the individual. To better understand mediated message flows and effects, new theoretical 
frameworks of curation require reexamining the types of people and conditions under which 
effects are present (Thorson & Wells, 2016). In addressing these issues, the present study has 
three specific goals. The first is to examine the influence of demographic factors (political 
ideology), behavioral factors (e.g. prior voting, political information seeking), and NFO (need 
for orientation) to better understand who shares fact-checks in social media. The second goal is 
to investigate whether NFO conditions which type of fact-checks are shared (those with rating 
scales versus context-only formats). The final aim is to explore whether fact-checks are more 
often shared for the purpose of attitude reinforcement or persuasive resistance.  
From the perspective that fact-checks are a form of persuasive communication (Garrett & 
Weeks, 2013), we extend past research on media effects by identifying theoretical mechanisms 
that may explain which individuals choose to share fact-checks and their persuasive intent of 
doing so. In this way, we reinforce the utility of connecting curation actions with individual-level 
characteristics (Thorson & Wells, 2016), offering a more nuanced understanding of who shares 
fact-checks on social media, and why. Furthermore, as a theoretical measure of an individual’s 
motivation to attend to news (Camaj & Weaver, 2013), we explore whether tenets of NFO 
extend beyond consumption to news sharing, as well. Following Shin and Thorson (2017), we 
avoid the type of experimental design that artificially exposes participants to content they may 
have little or no interest in consuming. Instead, we rely upon a content analysis of actual social 
media behavior drawn from Facebook and Twitter digital trace data (Freelon, 2014). An online 
survey (N = 783) was linked with this behavioral data allowing us to assess individual-level 
measures that may explain fact-check sharing behavior by public audiences in the U.S. To be 
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clear, we examine the lay public and not the sharing of fact-checks by other journalists. We end 
the paper with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Fact-checking Use and Sharing 
Despite the record-breaking traffic to fact-checking sites in 2016 (Mantzarlis, 2016b), little is 
published about who reads and shares fact-checks. What we do know about the public 
consumption of fact-checking is that although most people have favorable views of it, 
Republicans have less favorable attitudes than Democrats (Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Shin & 
Thorson, 2017). This is consistent with research indicating that Republicans, who consider most 
news organizations biased, have less favorable views of the U.S. media generally than do 
Democrats (Barthel & Mitchell, 2017; Mitchell, Gottfried, Kiley, & Matsa, 2014). Furthermore, 
to the limited degree that fact-checkers have any influence over the agendas of online news 
media, they are more likely to set the agenda for online emerging news media and liberal media 
sites (Vargo et al., 2018). Given that selective exposure predicts people will observe content that 
is consistent with their ideological worldview (Festinger, 1957; Stroud, 2008), we expect liberal 
leaning individuals are more likely to encounter and be receptive to fact-checks. Indeed, research 
during the 2016 U.S. election revealed that Clinton supporters were more likely to consume at 
least one fact-check than were Trump supporters (Guess et al., 2017).  
In addition to careful exposure to particular types of information, people also tend to be 
selective about the type of messages they share online. For instance, political bloggers tend to 
share webpages that are ideologically congenial to their position (Jacobson, Myung, & Johnson, 
2016). Similarly, retweets on Twitter are typically from people who share the same political 
views as the person who posted the original Tweet (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014). 
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Generally, liberals are more likely to share news on social media than are conservatives (Weeks 
& Holbert, 2013). Moreover, Shin and Thorson (2017) found that fact-checking users (which 
included those who shared) were 7.5 times more likely to identify as Democrat than Republican. 
Thus, based upon the foregoing discussion of polarized perceptions of news media, selective 
exposure, and selective sharing, we predict a positive relationship between members of the 
general public who identify as ideologically liberal and likelihood to share a fact-check on their 
Facebook or Twitter feed. 
H1: Ideologically liberal identification will have a positive relationship with 
propensity to post a fact-check. 
Beyond political affiliation, little is known about other characteristics of people who have 
propensities to share fact-checks on social media. When considering all news, Weeks & Holbert 
(2013) found that age and income both had a negative impact on the propensity of an individual 
to share news on social media. However, topic interest – such as politics – has been shown to 
lead to greater activity on social media (Ancu & Cozma, 2009). Thus, those who consume more 
news or politics may be more likely to share a fact-check. Moreover, if a stronger interest in 
politics, particularly among partisans, increases not only offline political behavior – such as 
voting – but online news sharing, as well (Weeks & Holbert, 2013), then propensity to vote may 
also be related to sharing fact-checks. Given this limited literature, we pose a research question: 
RQ1: Are there other demographic or behavioral differences related to the propensity to 
post fact-checks? 
Motivations: Need for Orientation 
Derived from functionalist motivational theories such as uses and gratifications (Weaver, 1980), 
NFO refers to individual-level needs for mass media-related orienting cues as they pertain to 
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specific social issues (Chernov, Valenzuela, & McCombs, 2011). In this sense, NFO exists as the 
predominant psychological mechanism in the explanation of agenda-setting effects (Matthes, 
2005; Weaver, 1980). Stated differently, those with high orientation needs tend to pay closer 
attention to the news media and, as such, are increasingly likely to incorporate the news agenda 
into their mental renderings of issue saliency. 
Individual needs for orientation are the product of two lower-order variables: relevance 
and uncertainty. Relevance refers to the degree to which a given event or occurrence (e.g., a 
presidential campaign) is perceived to be personally meaningful, and therefore of interest, to a 
given person (Camaj & Weaver, 2013). For its part, uncertainty refers to the degree to which an 
individual has achieved attitudinal definiteness regarding an issue. Orientation needs tend to be 
strongest when an individual perceives an issue as personally relevant but has not yet obtained 
attitudinal clarity on it (Weaver, 1980). Moderate orientation levels tend to be found in 
individuals who have high levels of interest in an issue but low levels of uncertainty. In some 
prior renderings of NFO – specifically as they relate to the consumption of political information 
(e.g., Camaj & Weaver, 2013) – such individuals have been described as partisans as they 
simultaneously possess high levels of interest in political issues and, therein, tend to hold 
strongly defined political preferences. Finally, low orientation needs are the result of low interest 
in an issue or event (Camaj & Weaver 2013; Weaver, 1980). 
Turning to the present research context, different levels of NFO may be useful in 
predicting the motivational conditions under which lay readers are more likely to share a fact-
check. For example, if it is indeed the case that high levels of NFO strongly relate to topical 
uncertainty and an associated motivation to turn to the media to find more information (Camaj & 
Weaver, 2013), then audience engagement with fact-checks as a source of information gain may 
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signal that they are being accessed for attitude formation purposes. That is, people interested in 
politics who are uncertain about the clarity of a particular issue and where they stand on it may 
turn to a fact-check as a means of coping with the ambiguous he said/she said style of journalism 
prevalent in political coverage (Amazeen, 2015). However, seeking out a fact-check to acquire 
useful information is not the same as sharing content, particularly if one is uncertain of what they 
will learn or what their own attitudes are. Past research indicates that although people will 
sometimes look to non-congenial information for the sake of staying informed (Knobloch-
Westerwick & Kleinman, 2012), publicly sharing that information is rare (Shin & Thorson, 
2017).  
More importantly, of the three levels of NFO, Camaj and Weaver (2013) found people 
with moderate levels were most likely to turn to the media for political information. If moderate 
levels of NFO indicate strong partisan or ideological identification and an interest in a topic 
(Camaj & Weaver, 2013), then the use of fact-checks may function to reinforce existing 
attitudes. Theories of cognitive dissonance and selective exposure (Festinger, 1957) suggest most 
people are unlikely to seek out, much less share, non-congenial information. Indeed, partisan 
sharing of fact-checks on Twitter was found to either promote congenial candidates or disparage 
opposing candidates (Shin & Thorson, 2017). Moreover, prior research has shown that political 
identification can be an important component of constructions of self-concept (Cohen et al, 
2007), especially when an individual possesses well-clarified and strongly held political beliefs. 
Sharing information about the self on social media platforms is one way to communicate 
important information about one’s identity (Hogan, 2010). It therefore follows that those with 
strong political beliefs may be most likely to share fact-checking information, as such behavior 
communicates important information about the individual and, in so doing, reinforces the self-
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concept. Finally, people with low levels of NFO would be unlikely to engage with fact-checking 
at all as they are not interested in politics. Given the foregoing arguments, it is theorized that 
NFO will influence how fact-checks are shared on social media, as follows: 
H2: Of the three levels of Camaj and Weaver’s (2013) NFO, moderate levels will be 
more likely to predict the number of fact-checks posted than will high or low 
levels of NFO. 
While traditional approaches to assessing NFO -- such as those employed by Weaver 
(1980), Camaj and Weaver (2013), and others -- are useful for understanding perspective and 
behavioral outcomes, they are generally ill-equipped to understand the precise needs underlying 
the orienting effect that compels people to seek out mass media (Matthes, 2005). For that reason, 
in this study, we also draw upon Matthes’ (2005) conceptualization of NFO. In contrast to prior 
work, Matthes theorized that orientation needs were contingent on one or more of the following 
three dimensions: orientation needs pertaining to issues, orientation needs pertaining to facts, and 
orientation needs pertaining to journalistic evaluations. The issues dimension is similar to 
information seeking, or a need for surveillance of topics in the news media that are personally 
relevant (Blumler, 1979). The facts dimension distinguishes those who are interested in sub-
aspects of an issue or details in how it is framed or discussed. The journalistic evaluative 
dimension pertains to a need for guidance information. These individuals find it important to 
know what journalists say about an issue (Matthes, 2005).  
As Matthes’ (2005) issues dimension is similar to information seeking, it relates to one’s 
desire to stay informed of the latest current events (Lin, Salwen, & Abdulla, 2005). This is 
consistent with the active audience perspective underlying the uses and gratifications approach 
that informs NFO, regarding people as motivated to select media content that gratifies their 
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needs (Rubin, 1993). However, people seek out relevant content not only for their own 
consumption, but also in anticipation of being able to share it to satisfy the information needs of 
others. For instance, research specific to news sharing on social media revealed that along with 
the motivational gratifications of socializing and status seeking, fulfilling the information needs 
of oneself and the future information needs of others was an influential driver (Lee & Ma, 2012). 
Moreover, people most engaged with news – those who followed a greater number of journalists 
or news organizations on social media – were more likely to share news stories online (Weeks & 
Holbert, 2013). The incidence of social media as a new forum for influencers to share content 
with their network of followers is reminiscent of the two-step flow model of communication 
(Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Oeldorf-Hirsch & Sundar, 2015) and consistent with the gatewatching 
approach of news curation (Bruns, 2011). Because this motivation seems to correspond to the 
way that Matthes (2005) conceptualized the issues dimension of NFO, and to the degree that 
audiences deem fact-checks as newsworthy (Barthel & Gottfried, 2016), it is likely that 
propensity to share political fact-checks will be influenced by this dimension. Furthermore, given 
the lack of evidence to suggest either of Matthes’ other NFO dimensions are related to fact-check 
sharing, we predict that: 
H3: Of the three dimensions of Matthes’ (2005) NFO, the issues dimension will most 
strongly predict propensity to share fact-checks. 
One of the core arguments to NFO as a distinct measure of motivation to attend to news 
is its ability to predict news-related effects better than the individual variables that comprise it 
(McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2014). To be sure, Camaj and Weaver (2013) found that 
uncertainty and interest, together, can better predict media-related effects such as media attention 
and news media agenda setting. If the power of NFO is truly novel, the concept will be more 
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predictive than its individual components not just for news consumption, but as it pertains to 
social media news sharing, as well. That is, NFO will better predict fact-check sharing on social 
media than either of its subcomponents, partisanship or relevance. Given H2 expects moderate 
levels of NFO to better predict the number of fact-checks posted than will high or low levels, we 
offer the following: 
H4: Moderate NFO – as conceptualized by Camaj and Weaver (2013) – will predict 
propensity to share fact-checks better than partisanship or relevance, alone. 
In addition to the individual characteristics that may condition the likelihood of sharing a 
fact-check, specific message factors may motivate sharing, as well. For instance, fact-checks in 
video format – such as from FlackCheck.org – are more effective than those in textual format 
(Young, Jamieson, Poulsen, & Goldring, 2018). In the U.S., however, the majority of fact-checks 
are text driven (Amazeen, 2013). But – perhaps to facilitate interpretation – most fact-checkers 
do employ some type of visual ratings meter that explicitly assesses a claim’s accuracy. For 
example, PolitiFact uses its six-level Truth-O-Meter and the Washington Post’s Fact Checker 
assigns from one to four Pinocchios. In contrast, other fact-checking organizations eschew the 
assignment of ratings instead relying upon contextual corrections to explain how a claim may be 
misleading (Amazeen, 2013; Graves, 2016). While both formats can be effective at correcting 
misperceptions, a narrow majority of consumers preferred the fact-checks with rating scales. 
Nonetheless, over 40% of surveyed consumers preferred the implicit contextual corrections used 
by FactCheck.org or the New York Times (Amazeen, Thorson, Muddiman, & Graves, 2018).  
These split format preferences seem to illustrate Matthes’ (2005) suggestion that 
individuals differ in their need for explicit versus implicit journalistic assessments. People who 
have a high NFO toward journalistic evaluations have a need for guidance information and, 
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therefore, are likely to prefer explicit evaluations that emphasize what to think. In contrast, those 
with lower needs for journalistic evaluations may prefer more implicit guidance that explains 
what to think about. In the context of fact-checking, for example, an explicit evaluation would 
address why a statement was “mostly false” whereas implicit guidance would explain how a 
statement may be inaccurate while allowing the reader to determine just how inaccurate it was. 
Thus, we hypothesize that the journalistic evaluation dimension of Matthes’ NFO will moderate 
which type of fact-checking format is shared, as follows: 
H5: The journalistic evaluation dimension of Matthes’ (2005) NFO will be a) 
positively related to one’s propensity to post fact-checks that include rating scales 
and b) negatively related to one’s propensity to post fact-checks that include 
contextual corrections.  
Attitudes and Persuasion 
Fact-checkers often insist that their work is not intended to change minds, but simply to provide 
information and educate audiences (Amazeen, 2013; Graves, 2016). As Graves (2016, p. 179) 
wrote, “Fact-checkers seek to inform but not, at least formally, to persuade or to influence.” 
Although the use of fact-checks has been widely studied in the academic literature to determine 
their efficacy in changing people’s beliefs (Graves & Amazeen, forthcoming), persuasion 
encompasses more than just changing existing attitudes. Outcomes of persuasion can also 
include shaping new attitudes as well as reinforcing existing ones (Miller, 1980/2013). Thus, 
when deployed in a preemptive manner, the consumption of fact-checks can serve to foster 
resistance to persuasive attitude change by inoculating people from misinformation. This pre-
bunking deployment of a fact-check has been compared to a medical inoculation (Cook, 
Lewandowsky, & Ecker, 2017). That is, by refuting misinformation before it has a chance to be 
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processed, individuals can be protected from developing misperceptions, much in the same way 
that vaccines protect from viruses. Moreover, just as vaccines promote development of 
antibodies, inoculation messages provide counterarguments that can be used to resist 
misinformation (McGuire, 1961). Furthermore, not only do these inoculations provide 
refutational counterarguments, but the process also motivates the generation of additional 
counterarguments by individuals (Ivanov et al., 2015).  
These organic arguments generated and elaborated on by an individual can be integral in 
affecting one’s attitudes. Positive statements to oneself about a message result in persuasion 
whereas negative statements – or counterarguing – result in resistance (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). 
The act of counterarguing has been defined as statements generated against a promoted position 
that offer alternative positions or challenge the accuracy or validity of a position (Miller & 
Baron, 1973). Although counterarguing has traditionally been viewed as an internal process, 
more recently post-inoculation talk has been explored as an external process that may entail 
communication with family or friends (Ivanov et al., 2015). Indeed, comments posted on Twitter 
have been examined to reveal favorable attitudes to congenial fact-checks and counterarguments 
against noncongenial fact-checks. In this way, we can see how people share and respond to fact-
checks on social media – with reinforcing comments toward their own candidate or by resisting 
fact-checking messages about a congenial candidate’s opponent (Shin & Thorson, 2017). 
Moreover, attitudes toward a message can be reliable indicators of behavioral intention to adopt 
the message position (Fazio & Olson, 2003). 
Because social media tend to foster homophilous relationships, like-minded individuals 
often follow one another. This effect is even more pronounced among Democrats than 
Republicans (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 2014). As sharing news online is a form of political 
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participation, people who do so may be looking to reinforce the attitudes of like-minded 
followers, particularly if the information is from a congenial source (Weeks & Holbert, 2013). 
Sharing news from an uncongenial source, while rare (Shin & Thorson, 2017), may signal the 
intent to foster resistance among like-minded followers (Weeks & Holbert, 2013).  In this same 
way, the valence of social media comments can signal the type of persuasive purpose for which 
fact-checks are being shared, particularly if posted on one’s Facebook wall or Twitter feed – 
rather than privately sent to a specific individual – where most friends and followers will be like-
minded. Given this logic:  
H6a: If fact-checks are being shared for attitude reinforcement, we expect the posted fact-
checking articles will be accompanied by a greater number of positive than negative 
comments. 
H6b: If fact-checks are being shared for persuasive resistance, we expect the posted fact-
checking articles will be accompanied by a greater number of negative comments 
(counter-arguments) than positive comments. 
Methods 
Protocol 
This study captures digital trace data: actual posts users made on Facebook and Twitter (Freelon, 
2014).1 Facebook is understudied compared to Twitter, despite being far more popular, largely 
because of the difficulties that researchers face to systematically analyze data from it (Zhang & 
Leung, 2014). The challenges are largely around the limitations Facebook puts on how 
researchers can collect user data (Wilson, Gosling & Graham, 2012). Here, in accordance with 
Facebook Platform Policies (Facebook Platform Policy, 2017), we adopt a novel approach 
following Wells and Thorson (2017). In so doing, we created an application that asked 
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participants to fill out a survey. Our institutional review board (IRB) vetted all study procedures 
and disclosures and granted approval. All data collection processes conformed to Facebook and 
Twitter's terms of service at the time of study execution.  
Participants for the non-probability sample were recruited between March 7 - June 6, 
2017 via an email invitation through Qualtrics, a U.S.-based panel provider. Sample inclusion 
was predicated upon respondents being U.S. citizens, holding accounts on both Facebook and 
Twitter, and having at least moderate levels of interest in U.S. politics. We also controlled for an 
approximate 50/50 gender split. Before participating in the study, participants were provided 
with a consent form that explained all data collection processes. Specifically, participants were 
told: 
At the start of the survey you will be asked to link your Facebook and Twitter account to 
our survey application. This application will be used to gather posts (e.g., wall posts and 
tweets) that you have made on the respective services. These messages will be collected 
anonymously, and at no time will the researchers know your identity, or the identities of 
your friends. The data will solely be used to better understand how you share news on 
social media. If you meet the above criteria and would like to participate in this study, 
please click the below link. 
 
The online survey included questions on interest and participation in politics, political ideology, 
media use, need for orientation, as well as basic demographic questions related to age, gender, 
and residency. Before completing the survey, participants were prompted to link their Facebook 
and Twitter accounts. Respondents who had no posts on the social platforms or failed to answer 
the survey questions or who completed the survey more than once were excluded from analyses. 
Among the 783 participants who successfully completed the survey, 59% were female with an 
average age of 39. Median survey length was 7 minutes.  
The following data types from each participants’ Facebook profile was retrieved using 
the Facebook Graph API: status updates (mobile and desktop), notes, shared stories, events, wall 
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posts, and stories. Tweets are the only content type available for Twitter, and as such were the 
only things stored. These data types all correspond to ways in which users can post textual 
content. Survey data and social media data were then anonymized. All names, usernames, names 
of friends, personal entities (e.g., entities that were identified as names by Facebook and Twitter) 
and personal identifying information (e.g., emails) were not stored. That is, these fields were 
omitted and not recorded in our databases at any time. Instead, an anonymous identification code 
was created in the survey document for each user and subsequently paired to social media data. 
Data were downloaded on June 6, 2017.  
874,266 unique URLs from 51,498 website domains were posted by study participants. 
Vargo, Guo, and Amazeen’s (2018) list of media sources were used to extract news content by 
media type from the posts. To identify fact-checking sites, we used the Duke Reporters’ Lab 
curated list of fact-checking organizations and news organizations that perform fact-checking 
(Adair & Stencel, 2016). All URLs included in Facebook and Twitter posts were inspected to see 
if they originated from a popular URL shortener service (e.g., bit.ly, or t.co). If a URL was 
shortened, it was expanded to its final destination using Python’s request functionality (Chandra 
& Varanasi, 2015).  
Inspection of URLs inside of posts that matched the fact-checking or news domains 
identified by the Duke Reporters’ Lab revealed a total of 8,949 articles. Of those URLs, 2,052 
(23% of the total) were manually inspected to see if the article indeed was a fact-checking 
article; many were not. This training data was used to build a Elasticnet Classifier model to 
classify the remainder of the URLs.2 At its core, it is a conservative model that only selects 
features that contribute unique and significant explanatory power. Through a 10-fold cross-
validation, the model was found to have an accuracy rate of 96.80% and a false positive rate of 
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less than .01%. Combined with a F1 = 97.31%, the authors believe the model was not only 
exhaustive in its detection of further URLs, but also non-biased across all classes. This 
supervised machine-learning approach to identify fact-checking items yielded 261 articles. 
Measures 
The dependent variable of number of posted fact-checks was calculated by summing the number 
of fact-checks posted to a participant’s Twitter and Facebook accounts. The majority of 
participants (85%) did not post any fact-checks (M = 0.34, SD = 1.50). Out of the 261 posted 
fact-checks by 118 participants, 70% included political fact-checks (some fact-checks by Snopes 
or Gossip Cop were decidedly non-political involving celebrity deaths or product reviews). Only 
11% of participants posted at least one political fact-check. Among those who did, the number 
ranged from 1 to 27 posts. Participants were more likely to post fact-checks on Twitter (11%, M 
= 0.23, SD = 1.24) than on Facebook (6%, M = 0.11, SD = 0.67). Six percent (6%) of participants 
posted fact-checks on both platforms. 
The independent variable of NFO was operationalized in two different ways. Following 
Camaj and Weaver (2013), NFO was based upon indexed measures of interest and ideology. A 
political interest index was calculated from four, seven-point Likert scales on the questions, “I’m 
interested in politics,” “I like to learn as much as I can about politics,” “I follow politics closely,” 
and “I enjoy talking about politics with others” (Cronbach’s α = .94, M = 5.27, SD = 1.44, lower 
numbers represent stronger disagreement). Ideology was indexed on three, seven-point bipolar 
scales (1= strongly liberal, 7 = strongly conservative) on the questions, “what is your political 
ideology,” “I tend to support candidates who are…,” and “I think of myself as a…” (α = .97, M = 
3.73, SD = 1.79). These two measures were combined to calculate three categorizations of NFO. 
The “low” category of NFO indicates participants (32%) with low levels of political interest (< 
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5) regardless of their ideological intensity. The “moderate” category of NFO indicates 
participants (43%) with high levels of political interest (> 5) and high levels of ideological 
intensity (< 3 or > 5). The “high” category of NFO indicates participants (25%) with high 
political interest (> 5) and low levels of ideological intensity (> 3 and < 5); what Camaj and 
Weaver (2013) refer to as “interested independents” (p. 1448). 
 Because of the bipolar nature of the ideology measure (with strong liberals being at the 
low end and strong conservatives at the high end of the continuum), we created an overall 
ideological intensity measure that simply accounted for the strength of ideological identification 
on a bipartisan basis. The three variables comprising ideology were recoded into a 4-point 
measure so that those with stronger ideological preferences were assigned higher scores (i.e., 
1=4, 2=3, 6=3, 7=4) and those with less polarized political preferences were assigned lower 
scores (3=2, 4=1, 5=2). The three measures were subsequently indexed (Cronbach’s α = .94; M = 
2.45, SD = 1.09).  
Finally, to more granularly explore the motivations underlying fact-check sharing, 
orientation needs were further assessed using Matthes’ (2005) NFO scale, which, itself, is 
comprised of three subscales tapping orientation needs pertaining to issues, facts, and journalistic 
elevations. Each subscale contained three items placed on Likert scales where 1 = strongly 
disagree and 7 = strongly agree. The issues dimension was indexed from the following questions: 
“I want to be instantly informed about recent developments in politics,” “It is important for me to 
constantly monitor issues related to politics,” and “I would like to hear something about politics 
every day” (α = .91, M = 5.05, SD = 1.44). The facts dimension was constructed using the 
following items: “I want to know/learn about the many different sides of American politics,” “I 
would like to be thoroughly informed about the specific details of political decisions made by 
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elected officials,” and “As it pertains to politics, I expect the news media to provide detailed 
background information” (α = .85, M = 5.38, SD = 1.29). Finally, the journalistic evaluations 
dimension was indexed based upon the following questions: “I attach great importance to the 
political commentaries voiced by members of the mass media,” “It is interesting to see how 
members of the news media comment on politics,” and “Whenever appropriate, members of the 
news media should state their opinions on politics” (α = .81, M = 4.38, SD = 1.53).   
Among the 182 political fact-checking posts, 45% included some sort of unique 
commentary added by the account owner. These comments were coded by one of the authors for 
their polarity. A random subset of the posts (n = 31) was coded by a second author, 
demonstrating acceptable inter-coder reliability (Krippendorff’s α = .83).3 Following Cacioppo 
and Petty (1981), negative comments were defined as those that counterargue, challenge the 
validity of, or offer alternative information to the posted fact-check (e.g., “How can a statement 
be half-true?”). Positive comments were defined as those which validate or suggest 
agreement/belief in the fact-check (e.g., “People are sharing this rumor and it’s just not true.”). 
Neutral comments were those that offered neither favorable nor unfavorable statements (e.g., 
“@janedoe.”).  
Fact-checking format was determined by inspection of the posted fact-checks. Posts were 
discriminated between those that linked to a fact-check which included a visual rating scale (such 
as PolitiFact’s “Truth-O-Meter”) and those that simply used contextual language to make a 
correction. Among the posted political fact-checks, 69% included a rating scale, 31% only 
included a contextual correction. This is consistent with past research indicating audiences prefer 
fact-checks with rating scales (Amazeen et al., 2018). 
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 Additional independent variables, some of which were used as controls in certain 
analyses, included years of Facebook account ownership (M = 6.77, SD = 2.43), years of Twitter 
account ownership (M = 3.40, SD = 2.45), participant age (M = 39.34, SD = 12.90), gender (with 
male as the high value of 1, M = 0.41, SD = 0.49), dummy variables for Democrat (40%), 
Independent (33%), Republican (24%), or some other party (4%), voted in the 2016 U.S. 
Presidential election (with yes as the high value of 2, M = 1.84, SD = 0.37), and vote choice 
(Clinton = 42%, Trump = 30%, Other = 14%). As a proxy for news consumption, frequency of 
reading the news was measured using a seven-point bipolar scale (1 = never, 7 = frequently) by 
asking participants, “About how often do you read the newspaper, either in hardcopy or online?” 
(M = 4.21, SD = 2.05). As a proxy for political interest, social media political information 
seeking was measured using a seven-point bipolar scale (1 = never, 7 = frequently) by asking, 
“About how often would you say that you purposefully seek out political information on social 
media?” (M = 4.28, SD = 2.04).  
Results 
To explore whether there were demographic characteristics that distinguished participants with a 
propensity to post political fact-checks (H1 and RQ1), a negative binomial regression model was 
estimated with the number of fact-checks posted as the dependent variable and independent 
variables of age, gender, party identification (dummy vars), ideology, and age of Facebook and 
Twitter accounts (see Table 1).4 The model was significant, indicating differences based upon 
quantity of posted political fact-checks [LR χ2 (8) = 299.78, p < .001, Pearson χ2 = 944.23, 
residual df = 759, dispersion statistic = 1.24]. Coefficients for participant age [Exp(B) = 1.03; p 
< .01] and ideology [Exp(B)= 0.65; p < .001] were significant indicating that participants who 
were older in age and were liberal leaning were more likely to post a fact-check. Adding 
22 
behavioral variables to a second model, including voting in the 2016 presidential election, vote 
choice in the 2016 election, frequency of reading the news, and social media political-
information seeking, produced a more robust model [LR χ2 (13) = 318.02, p < .001, Pearson χ2 = 
961.50, residual df = 748, dispersion statistic = 1.29]. While participant age [Exp(B) = 1.03; p < 
.01] and ideology [Exp(B) = 0.79; p < .05] remained significant, the coefficients for voting for 
Clinton [Exp(B) = 3.91; p < .05] and social media political-information seeking [Exp(B) = 1.20; 
p < .05] also reached statistical significance. Thus, H1 has been supported – identifying as liberal 
had a positive relationship to propensity to post fact-checks. Furthermore, voting for Clinton, 
more frequent social media political-information seeking and increasing age were also 
distinguishing characteristics of those who shared fact-checks. 
-- [Insert Table 1 about here] -- 
To establish whether the moderate level of Camaj and Weaver’s (2013) NFO best 
predicts the propensity to share political fact-checks (H2), a negative binomial regression was 
specified with the number of posted fact-checks as the dependent variable and low, moderate, 
and high levels of NFO as the independent variable (with low as the referent category). Because 
they were found to vary with the sharing of fact-checks, age, voting for Clinton, and social media 
political-information seeking were held constant at their means. The model was significant 
indicating that an individual’s NFO does affect propensity to post fact-checks on social media 
[LR χ2 (2) = 266.26, p < .001, Pearson χ2 = 1,094.95, residual df = 761, dispersion statistic = 
1.44]. Compared to those with low NFO, the coefficient for moderate NFO was significant 
[Exp(B) = 4.04; p < .001]. A second model with high NFO as the referent category also indicated 
a significant coefficient for moderate NFO [Exp(B) = 3.19; p < .01]. Those with moderate levels 
of NFO were predicted to post an average of 0.49 fact-checks compared to only 0.16 for those 
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with high NFO and .12 for those with low NFO. Those with moderate NFO had a higher 
incidence of posting political fact-checks than those with high or low NFO (see Table 2). Thus, 
H2 is supported.  
-- [Insert Table 2 about here] -- 
The relationship between Matthes’ (2005) three dimensions of NFO and posting fact-
checks on social media was analyzed using a negative binomial regression model with the 
number of posted political fact-checks as the dependent variable and each of the dimensions of 
NFO as independent variables: issues, facts, and evaluations. H3 predicted that the issues 
dimension would be most likely to predict sharing. Age, ideology, voting for Clinton, and social 
media political-information seeking were held constant. A significant model suggests a 
relationship between the NFO dimensions and propensity to post political fact-checks [LR χ2 (3) 
= 265.53, p < .001, Pearson χ2 = 1,328.18, residual df = 753, dispersion statistic = 1.76]. The 
coefficient for the issues dimension was significant [Exp(B) = 1.73; p < .05] indicating that the 
need for surveillance of issues increased the propensity to share fact-checks. Because neither of 
the other dimensions were significant predictors of sharing fact-checks, H3 has been supported.  
More than measures of ideological intensity or relevance, independently, a moderate 
level of Camaj and Weaver’s (2013) NFO was expected to better predict propensity to share fact-
checks (H4). To test this hypothesis, a series of negative binomial regression models was 
estimated. Each model specified the number of fact-checks posted as the dependent variable. The 
first model assessed the effects of ideological intensity and relevance levels as independent 
variables. In the second model, a dummy variable for moderate NFO, as conceptualized by 
Camaj and Weaver (2013), was substituted as the independent variable. Age, voting for Clinton, 
and social media political information seeking were held constant at their means in both models. 
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In the first model [LR χ2 (2) = 263.07, p < .001; Pearson χ2 = 1,298.67, residual df = 761, 
dispersion statistic = 1.71; AIC = 800.19], we observed a significant relationship between 
ideological intensity [Exp(B) = 1.41, p < .05] and fact-check sharing and a marginally significant 
relationship between relevance [Exp(B) = 1.24, p < .06] and fact-check sharing. In the second 
model [LR χ2 (1) = 266.98, p < .001; Pearson χ2 = 1,097.67, residual df = 765, dispersion statistic 
= 1.44; AIC = 795.82], we also observed a significant parameter estimate between moderate 
NFO [Exp(B) = 3.63, p < .001] and propensity to post fact-checks. Comparative examination of 
the two models indicated that model two featured a lower AIC statistic (ΔAIC = -4.37) and a 
dispersion statistic substantially closer to 1.00, which, taken together, suggest the second model 
was a better fit for the data. Moreover, a third model was estimated with the number of fact-
checks posted as the dependent variable and independent variables of ideological intensity, 
relevance, and the dummy variable for moderate NFO. Age, voting for Clinton, and social media 
political information seeking were again specified as controls. Model 3 was significant [LR χ2 (3) 
= 267.19, p < .001; Pearson χ2 = 1,007.28, residual df = 760, dispersion statistic = 1.46; AIC = 
798.15] as was only one parameter coefficient: moderate NFO [Exp(B) = 2.74, p < .05]. Neither 
the ideological intensity nor the relevance coefficients approached significance (p > .10). Thus, 
as predicted by H4, NFO – specifically the moderate category – functions as a stronger predictor 
of fact-check sharing than ideological intensity or relevance alone. 
To determine whether the journalistic evaluation dimension of Matthes’ NFO moderates 
the type of fact-checking format shared by participants (H5a/b), a t-test was used to compare the 
mean scores on this dimension. There was no statistical difference (p > .05) in the evaluation 
dimension scores of participants who posted any contextual fact-checks (M = 4.38, SD = 1.35) 
compared to those who posted any fact-checks with rating scales (M = 4.48, SD = 1.65), perhaps 
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because many participants posted both types of fact-check formats. To further explore the 
relationships, two separate negative binomial regression models were specified with the number 
of fact-checks shared for each format type as the dependent variables and the journalistic 
evaluation dimension of Matthes’ NFO as the independent variable. Age, ideology, voting for 
Clinton, and social media political information seeking were held constant. A significant model 
[LR χ2 (1) = 6.48, p < .05, Pearson χ2 = 3,478.37, residual df = 761, dispersion statistic = 4.57] 
indicates the evaluation dimension was a significant predictor of the number of fact-checks with 
rating scales shared [Exp(B) = 1.17; p < .05). However, this was not the case in the alternate 
model of the number of contextual fact-checks shared (p > .05). This reveals that the more likely 
one is to value what members of the news media say about an issue, the greater the propensity to 
share a fact-check utilizing the rating scale format but not the contextual format. Thus, there is 
support for H5a but not H5b. 
In exploring whether fact-checks were shared for attitude reinforcement (H6a) or 
persuasive resistance (H6b), we examined the comments that were included by participants who 
posted a political fact-check to their Twitter or Facebook page. Examining only the posts with 
political fact-checks, over half (55%) offered no commentary beyond a retweet or the headline of 
the fact-check article. However, consistent with H6a, 41% of the posts did provide unique 
commentary and were positive, validating the contents of the fact-check such as, “Nice simple 
and concise info about vaccinating your child...please read,” or “Read the entire Snopes article 
which totally debunks this rumor.” These comments suggested reinforcing prior beliefs rather 
than being persuaded to change existing beliefs or forming new ones. Only 3% of the comments 
counter-argued against or challenged the validity of the fact-check such as, “Strange...so does 
this mean @RealBenCarson was right last year @PolitiFact?” or “Debt Free America Act...It is 
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true…” despite the fact-check showing otherwise. Thus, the evidence suggests support for fact-
checks being shared for attitude reinforcement (H6a) rather than resistance (H6b). 
Discussion 
Rapid changes to the information environment coupled with an abdication of long-standing 
political norms have left journalists, scholars, and citizens scrambling to adjust to the realities of 
a seemingly post-fact world (Mantzarlis, 2016a). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the role of fact-
checking in democratic communications – particularly as it relates to online deliberation – has 
been subject to an increased amount of scholarly attention. That said, relatively little is known 
about the individual-level characteristics of those who post fact-check articles online. 
Accordingly, this study set out to better understand the relationship between demographic, 
behavioral, and motivational factors and the sharing of fact-checking content in political 
conversations on social media. Our findings show that sharing fact-checks is linked to age, 
ideology, and political behaviors. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, our results suggest 
that an individual’s NFO is an important mechanism influencing not only one’s propensity to 
share a fact-check, but the type of fact-check format (with or without a ratings scale) that is 
shared. Finally, the data suggest that participants shared fact-checks to reinforce their existing 
attitudes. As the news industry reorients itself to a curated flow of content diffusion (Thorson & 
Wells, 2015), these findings offer important theoretical as well as practical implications.  
First, the results of this study suggest that only a small contingent of people are engaged 
in sharing political fact-checks on social media. In our sample, just 11% of respondents posted at 
least one political fact-check article. The likelihood of posting a fact-check to either one’s 
Facebook or Twitter account increased with age, a liberal ideology, voting for Clinton, and 
among those most likely to seek out political information on social media. From a practical 
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standpoint, knowing who shares fact-checks signals a potential pathway for journalists to further 
disseminate media content. In the digital media environment, it is no longer just the elite 
institutions of news that influence audiences. With the evolving media ecosystem, journalistic 
enterprises must engage with social media audiences in order to maintain their legitimacy 
(Cappella et al., 2015; Pearson & Kosicki, 2017; Thorson & Wells, 2015). Indeed, for those who 
consume news via social media, gatewatchers are becoming more influential than the original 
news sources (Media Insight, 2017). Moreover, fact-checks on social media are more likely to 
draw attention and responses when they come from friends (Margolin, Hannak, & Weber, 2017). 
Thus, engaging with active sharers of fact-checks may become easier when following the axiom 
of “know your audience.”  
Second, and looking beyond demographic factors, our results suggest that the 
motivational state described by NFO has important theoretical implications as it pertains to 
sharing fact-check articles. Stated differently, while our study comports with other research 
demonstrating that ideological intensity is an important mechanism influencing the likelihood 
that individuals will share a fact-check (Shin & Thorson, 2017), we demonstrate that an 
individual’s NFO is an even stronger predictor than ideological intensity, alone. Thus, by 
theoretically extending the traditional conception of NFO from just a precursor to news 
consumption (Camaj & Weaver, 2013; Weaver, 1980), this study shows that the motivational 
state described by NFO also has implications related to sharing news content. Specifically, 
beyond just those with strongly defined political preferences, it is individuals who also have high 
interest levels in politics that were most likely to post fact-checks. This revelation provides a 
more nuanced understanding of the characteristics of who shares fact-checks.  
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Those with moderate and high levels of NFO are in a specific motivational state, one that 
is attentive and actively seeking political news (Camaj & Weaver, 2013). Here, by adopting the 
Matthes (2005) vision of issue importance, we paint an even finer picture of individuals not just 
interested generally in politics, but those who are specifically interested in the substantive nature 
of political issues themselves. This focused view of NFO is logical; those who care about issues 
and are motivated to seek out more information are also the ones who share fact checks. 
Moreover, these gatewatchers (Bruns, 2011) appear to share fact-checks to reinforce attitudes of 
followers. Thus, not only is NFO an explanatory mechanism as it relates to how media influence 
what an individual thinks about, it also has theoretical significance in explaining behavior: 
presently, why people share fact-checks. In this way, these findings contribute to the literature on 
social curators (Thorson & Wells, 2016). 
Such theoretical extension of NFO may have important ramifications for media effects 
generally and fact-checking research specifically. That is, as media effects research has become 
increasingly concerned with the diffusion of messages, understanding the factors that cultivate 
and inhibit the sharing of information is now just as important as understanding the initial 
selection and avoidance of mediated messages (Cappella et al., 2015; Pearson & Kosicki, 2017; 
Thorson & Wells, 2015). In this same way, concerns over the effects of fact-checking should 
move beyond a limited effects approach (e.g., changing attitudes or beliefs) to also include 
resisting misinformation and reinforcing accurate beliefs. Furthermore, as this study has 
demonstrated, not only is sharing an effect in and of itself, but the conditions under which it 
occurs can be further scrutinized for additional insights. 
In addition to why people share fact-checks, our findings indicate that NFO is also a 
mechanism for explaining format preference when sharing fact-checks. Specifically, Matthes’ 
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(2005) NFO dimension of journalistic evaluation was successful in predicting which type of fact-
checking format individuals had a propensity to share. Those who had a need for explicit 
evaluations from journalists had a greater propensity for sharing fact-checks with explicit rating 
scales. Thus, rather than an arbitrary consumer preference, there appears to be a psychological 
explanation for the use of one format over another. To the degree that fact-checking is a product, 
its producers need to understand how and why consumers are using it. Consistent with Amazeen 
and colleagues (2018), this study further validates the practical need for different fact-checking 
formats to appeal to different types of users.  
Finally, if consumers are sharing fact-checks to reinforce their currently-held positions as 
indicated by this study, fact-check publishers/producers can leverage this knowledge to further 
promote this type of behavior. For instance, while some fact-checkers already participate in the 
“share the facts” initiative which embeds a widget that facilitates one-click sharing on social 
media (Sharockman, 2016), other marketing communication efforts can highlight sharing 
evidence of “what you already knew was true.” As Oeldorf-Hirsch and Sundar (2015) observe, it 
is becoming increasingly important to encourage and leverage influencers to act as sources of 
accurate information in their online social networks. At the same time, these findings also 
underscore the imbalance between liberal and conservative perceptions of fact-checking noted in 
the extant literature (e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Shin & Thorson, 2017). The revelation that 
conservatives were less likely to share fact-checks warrants future study. 
Limitations 
As with any research, certain limitations need acknowledgement. We want to emphasize that our 
data collection efforts focused on the natural social media behavior of Facebook and Twitter 
users, generally. While the sampling frame of Shin and Thorson (2017) was comprised of fact-
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checks generated by FactCheck.org, PolitiFact.com, the Washington Post’s Fact Checker and the 
subsequent comments and retweets these generated, our study only considered fact-checks that 
were organically posted to an individual’s Facebook or Twitter account. Moreover, we 
acknowledge that our nonprobability sample of 783 people, while relatively robust compared to 
other survey samples discussed in this study, is still likely not representative of all U.S. Facebook 
and Twitter users. Furthermore, participants willing to link their social media accounts to a 
research survey may be different than people unwilling to do so. These limitations warrant 
further replication of the claims provided here. 
In general, this study pivots from the broad, all-encompassing theories in traditional mass 
communication. Theories such as agenda-setting have been often conceptualized as audience and 
individually agnostic; all participants exhibit largely the same effect (McCombs, Shaw & 
Weaver, 2014). Here we observe distinctly different media-effects at the individual level. In this 
way, there is no one effect that is consistent; everything is contingent on the individual (Thorson 
& Wells, 2016). The authors here feel that given the plethora of media-related choices that exist, 
this approach (vs. a mass effect approach) most accurately describes the dynamic, and user-
centric environment in which users now interact with social media online. Media are not a 
hypodermic needle, and consumer choice is now king with gatewatchers among those 
contributing to the curation of news flows (Bruns, 2011; Pearson & Kosicki, 2017; Thorson & 
Wells, 2015; 2016). However, given that this analysis has opened up the possibility that 
individuals can, and should vary based on their individuality, there are most certainly other 
motivational and demographic independent variables that might encourage individuals to share 
fact-checking content on social media. Here, we surveyed popular motivations often discussed in 
the literature, but broader sets of uses and gratifications exist (see Blumler, 1979; Rubin, 1993). 
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Further study should consider additional motivating factors in order to more robustly support 
NFO as a truly unique driver of sharing as it pertains to social media. Beyond this, the authors 
encourage the analysis of other offline behaviors, such as civic and political engagement as they 
relate to fact-check sharing.  
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Endnotes 
1 One limitation of big data research on social media is bots (i.e., web robots) and the inability to know 
who a user actually is. Our study is novel in that we use data from real users verified through the 
Qualtrics Panel service and the Facebook platform itself. As such, we are highly confident that the social 
data we studied here are from real users. 
2 ElasticNet is a linear machine learning model trained with L1 and L2 prior as regularizer (Blondel, Seki, 
& Uehara, 2013). Features used to build the model were unigrams, both from the text of the 
corresponding Twitter or Facebook post (e.g., the text of the tweet or the description of the article as 
pulled in by Facebook) and tokenized unigrams from the expanded URL itself (e.g., “fact,” “claims”). 
3 Disagreements were addressed by a third author. 
4 Negative binomial regression models were specified in our analyses because the outcome variables are 
counts of the number of posted fact-checks with over-dispersed distributions where the mean values are 
smaller than the variance. 
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